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Recent Decisions
ADMIRALTY-DAMAGES-AWARD ALLOWED FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
OF SURVIVING SPOUSES AND CHILDREN, OR PARENTS, UNDER GENERAL
MARITIME LAW

Petitioner, a shipowner, filed a petition for exoneration from or

limitation of liability against individual claimants, injured seamen and
surviving families of deceased seamen, in a case arising out of a ship
collision on the Mississippi River.' Claimants alleged that operational
negligence caused the seamen's deaths2 and that damages for the
emotional distress of the surviving families should be awarded
pursuant to either the Jones Act 3 or general maritime law.4 Petitioner
contended that neither the Jones Act nor general maritime law
permitted recovery beyond pecuniary damages. The District Court for

the Eastern District of Louisiana, held, judgment for the claimants.
Damages for the emotional distress of the surviving spouses and
children, or parents, of the deceased seamen may be awarded under
general maritime law. In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp.
652 (E.D. La. 1971).
Prior to Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,6 a true admiralty
cause of action for wrongful death existed only under the Death on
the High Seas Act (DOHSA). 7 In Moragne, the Supreme Court elimi1. The court determined that the collision between petitioner's ship and the
Coast Guard buoy tender resulted from the mutual fault of both vessels.
2. The instant court found that a viable cause of action lay in seaworthiness.
Operational negligence may constitute a cause of action in negligence or
seaworthiness, depending upon the circumstances in which the act is drawn into
question. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 418 (1953); Mahnich v.
Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).

3. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). The Act adopts by reference the rights and
remedies afforded under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § §
51-60 (1970), which gives the personal representative of the spouse, children, or
parents a cause of action in negligence against the decedent seaman's employer.
Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 374-75 (1932).
4. The breach of a maritime duty which results in death gives rise to a cause of
action for wrongful death. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375
(1970).
5. Damages totaled $800,000, of which $300,000 was attributable to the
holding.

6. 398 U.S. 375 (1970), overruling The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
7. 46 U.S.C. § § 761, 762 (1970). DOHSA applies only to actions arising
beyond the three-mile limit. Seamen are covered in territorial waters as well as on

VANDERBIL T JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LA W

nated the basic anomaly of federal maritime tort law that death
caused by an unseaworthy vessel beyond the three-mile limit imposed
liability under DOHSA, s but not within the territorial waters of a
state whose wrongful death statute excluded unseaworthiness claims.9
In Moragne, the Court not only disapproved the three-mile limit as an
inappropriate guide for the choice of maritime law," ° but also gave
seamen a comprehensive maritime cause of action for death attributable to an unseaworthy vessel.' I The elements and damages of the
cause of action are seemingly circumscribed and co-extensive with

the high seas by the Jones Act as employees in a court of law under FELA, not as
seamen in a court of admiralty under maritime principles. See 398 U.S. at 407.
In addition, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33
U.S.C. § 901 (1970), and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §
1331 (1970) provide death and injury actions for non-seamen.
8. The Court noted that the DOHSA was not intended to be an exclusive
remedy for unseaworthiness claims and intimated that general maritime and
DOHSA recovery for wrongful death based on seaworthiness could either be
joined or elected in an admiralty proceeding.
9. See, e.g., Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930); Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969) (Jones Act supercedes all state
actions for death as result of negligence).
10. Beyond the three-mile limit the Jones Act and DOHSA give concurrent
causes of action for death caused by negligence. Negligence under the Jones Act
covers most types of unseaworthiness With the exception of unseaworthiness for
which the shipowner-employer is in no way at fault, while DOHSA includes a
separate cause of action for unseaworthiness. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE
LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-37 (1957). Within the three-mile limit the Jones Act,

which is grounded basically in negligence, is the exclusive federal cause of action
for wrongful death. General maritime law now gives a cause of action in
seaworthiness within and without the three-mile limit. 398 U.S. at 401.
11. Seaworthiness is a relative concept which contemplates a ship and crew
reasonably prepared for the forthcoming voyage. M. NORRIS, MARITIME
PERSONAL INJURIES §§ 29-34 (2d ed. 1966). See also Mahnich v. Southern
S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1944) (the duty is absolute and is not predicated
on negligence and not satisfied by due diligence; it includes operating negligence);
The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903) (seaworthiness includes the duty to furnish a
seaworthy ship).
"The only case which is today clearly outside the scope of the unseaworthiness doctrine is the almost theoretical construct of an injury whose only cause is
an order improvidently given by a concededly competent officer on a ship
admitted to be in all respects seaworthy." G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note
10, at 320. Because it amounts to liability without fault, seaworthiness constitutes
the main cause of action for personal injury and death. See generally Mitchell v.
Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Benbow, Seaworthiness and Seamen, 9
MIAMI L.Q. 418 (1955).
Winter, 1971
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those of DOHSA.' 2 Damages under DOHSA are limited to compensation for "pecuniary loss"'' sustained by a spouse, parent, child, or
dependent relatives. 4 Damages for loss of support, loss of decedent's
wages and services, funeral expenses, and decedent's pain and suffering
before death are proper elements of pecuniary damage.' I They may
also include punitive damages. 6 Pecuniary damages do not, however,
include damages for loss of consortium' 7 or society and companionship.8 In Michigan Central v. Vreeland, the Supreme Court held that
"pecuniary" loss does not include damages for grief or wounded
feelings. 9 The Court reasoned that loss must be capable of
measurement by some standard that is susceptible to monetary
12. The Attorney General, amicus curiae in Moragne, suggested that DOHSA
should form the standard guideline for lower courts filling in the framework of
the new cause of action. Justice Harlan noted the suggestion and intimated that
traditional maritime principles and Congressional expressions of maritime policy
should furnish adequate precedent for the courts in light of their present
experience in the area. 398 U.S. at 407-08.
13. 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1970). "The recovery... shall be a fair and just
compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the person for whose benefit the
suit is brought...."
14. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970). The suit may be maintained "... for the

exclusive benefit fo the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent
relative.. . ." The Four Sisters, 75 F. Supp. 399 (D. Mass. 1947) (the father of
the decedent seaman could recover under the Jones Act and the sister could
recover as a dependent relative under the DOHSA); cf. Civil v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 217 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1954). While the Jones Act beneficiaries are listed in
order of priority classes, the DOHSA beneficiaries are not. See Bailey v. Baltimore

Mail S.S. Co., 43 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
15. See, e.g., In re Marina Mercante Nicaraguense, 248 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), modified 364 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1966). The amount recovered included
interest from the time of death. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295
F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989, 370 U.S. 937 (1963).
In Michigan Central R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913), FELA and,
therefore, the Jones Act were held to limit recovery to "pecuniary loss or
damage... which can be measured by some standard." Id. at 71. Pecuniary loss
seemingly encompasses the same kind of loss for purposes of both the Jones Act
and DOHSA. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Lamp, 436 F.2d 1256 (6th
Cir. 1970); The Four Sisters, 75 F. Supp. 399 (D. Mass. 1947).
16. Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Mich. 1970),
noted in 24 VAND. L. REv. 631 (1971).
17. Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 266 (2d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964).
18. Michigan Central R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 70 (1913); Middleton v.
Luckenback S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1934).
19. Michigan Central R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 70 (1913).
Vol. 5-No. 1
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evaluation and that can be supplied by the service of another for
compensation. 2 In United States Steel Corp. v. Lamp,2 1 the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that general maritime law
awards pecuniary damages which reflect the Michigan Central
standard. Only elements properly included in the Jones Act or
DOHSA awards were to be included in general maritime awards for
wrongful death.2 2
The court in the instant case noted the absence of awards for
emotional distress in wrongful death claims. Observing that many state
courts permit non-pecuniary damages in ordinary wrongful death
actions2" and that the Jones Act and DOHSA cases award damages
for the suffering of the deceased before death,2 4 the court found no
more difficulty in awarding damages for the emotional distress of
widows and children or parents than in estimating the award for the
suffering of the deceased.2 I The court, which reasoned that Moragne's
main purpose was to up-date admiralty law,2 6 dismissed any conflict
between its holding and prior law and held that an award of damages
for emotional distress was proper.
Two principal reasons explain the past failure of courts to award
damages for the emotional distress and grief of the surviving family of
the decedent. First, the courts tend to view the entire pecuniary
damage concept as a device for controlling excessive awards by
overzealous juries. 2" Secondly, the courts recognize that factors
necessary to evaluate such claims are highly subjective and involve a
20. Id. But cf. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915)
(pain and suffering prior to death is a proper element of pecuniary damages). See
also Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 320 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Mich. 1970)
(punitive damages granted).
21. 436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970).
22. 436 F.2d at 1275-79. See generally 2 M. NoRRis, THE LAw OF
SEAMEN §§ 650-704 (3d ed. 1970); M. NORRIS, MARITIME PERSONAL
INJURIES § § 33-39 (2d ed. 1966).
23. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §127 (4th ed. 1970); Note, Death of
the Head of the Family, 19 S.C.L. REV. 220 (1967). See also Plant v. Simmons
Co., 321 F. Supp. 735 (D. Md. 1970) (interpreting the prospectivity of MD. ANN.
CODE art. 67, § 4 (1957), which permits recovery for mental anguish, emotional
pain and suffering and loss of companionship).
24. See cases cited notes 15 and 20 supra.

25. The court noted that Louisiana has permitted recovery for emotional
distress suffered by the surviving family for many years. See 329 F. Supp. at 655
n.6.
26. See 398 U.S. at 385-90.
27. Duffey, The Maldistribution of Damages in Wrongful Death, 19 OHIO ST.
L.J. 264, 272 (1958).
Winter, 1971
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large element of speculation. Neither of these reasons, however, is
persuasive when contrasted with the rationale of the instant decision
and past judicial practice. The size of verdicts returned by juries and
upheld by courts indicates sub rosa acceptance of the grief element in
the award of damages. 2 Furthermore, the extant fear of the jury's
zeal is a consideration absent in an admiralty court which generally
sits without a jury.2 9 The absence of a standard for recovery does not
prevent the courts from including the emotional distress of the
decedent as an element of the pecuniary award. 3 Additionally, the
civil code, from which admiralty traces many of its principles,3 1
permits recovery for emotional distress suffered by decedent's spouse,
children, parents, or family. 32 Finally, Moragne intended to impose
uniform liability for a breach of a maritime duty resulting in death and to
up-date admiralty principles, especially admiralty's special solicitude
for the welfare of seamen. 3 3 The instant decision should be viewed as
an accurate interpretation of both the scope and intent of Moragne.
The court properly focuses on the dominant purposes of Moragne, but
it fails to recognize fully the scope of its holding. The nature of
pecuniary damages is grounded in dependency, whereas the nature of
emotional damages is founded on the legal relationship of the
aggrieved parties. 3 4 Furthermore, the instant court is aware that its
decision conflicts with the Jones Act and DOHSA decisions, but it

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1970).
See cases cited note 20 supra.
See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 10, at § § 1-1 to 1-4.
See 6 M. PLANIOL & G. RIPERT, TRAITE PRACTIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANQAIS § § 546 & 549 (2d ed. 1952). All damages are recoverable
whether or not susceptible to exact evaluation. They are recoverable to the
decedent's spouse, children, parents and allies (family by marriage). Mistresses and
fiances are not included. Id. at § § 549-52.
33. 398 U.S. at 386-87. "Maritime law had always... been a thing apart from
the common law. It was. .. administered by different courts; it owed a much
greater debt to the civil law; and, from its focus on a particular subject matter, it
developed general principles unknown to the common law. These principles
included a special solicitude for the welfare of those men who undertook to
venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages." See, e.g., S.E. MORIS ON,
THE EUROPEAN

DISCOVERY OF AMERICA; THE NORTHERN VOYAGES

A.D. 500-1600 (1971) for an insight into the nature of the pre-seventeenth
century maritime existence that compelled admiralty to adopt that "special
solicitude."
34. See, e.g., Civil v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 217 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1954). The
court strained to grant damages to an abandoned widow over Judge Hand's
vigorous dissent. This case therefore may be considered together with St. Louis,
Vol. 5-No. 1
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does not account adequately for the conflict with the statutes' basic
premise that relatives can recover only if their dependency on the
decedent is established in fact. Logically, there is no reason to prove
dependency in order to recover emotional damages. The conflict in
policies is not of the instant court's making, but is inherent in
Moragne.3 5 Nevertheless, the instant decision is a significant step in
bringing admiralty to the forefront of tort law. It enhances the
desirability of a general maritime recovery over the DOHSA and Jones
Act remedies. The decision is also an important illustration of the
growing judicial acceptance of recovery for non-pecuniary injuries.
Future courts considering the awardability of beneficiaries' emotional
distress under the Jones Act, DOHSA, and FELA will undoubtedly be
influenced by the instant court's holding. Such influence will be even
more likely if the courts recognize that an award for emotional
distress is not a sympathetic gratuity but, rather, an approximate
attempt to indemnify the surviving beneficiaries' total loss.
Arthur R. Louv

I.M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915), in giving damages for the
decedent's pain and suffering as lineal predecessors of the instant decision. The
French Civil Code is not grounded on dependency, as is the Jones Act and
DOHSA, but on the legal relationship. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note
10, at § § 1-1 to 1-4.
35. See 398 U.S. at 408. Final resolution of any questions regarding the
substance of the cause of action awaits future determination even though
"Congress has expressed its preference of beneficiaries" (emphasis added). The
Court held that a "violation of maritime duties" gives rise to the cause of action.
This may be interpreted to include not only seaworthiness but also negligence
which would make the DOHSA and Jones Act useful reference points and nothing
more.
Winter, 1971
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ANTITRUST-EXTRATERRITO RIAL

JURISDICTION-EFFORTS

TO

SE-

CURE ACTION BY A FOREIGN STATE CONDUCIVE TO MONOPOLIZATION
NOT PRIVILEGED; ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE BARS ANTITRUST CLAIM
ARISING FROM ACTS OF A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN ALLEGEDLY INDUCED
BY DEFENDANT

Plaintiff, an importer of petroleum into the United States, brought

a private antitrust action for damages and injunctive relief against
defendants, an American oil company and its officers.' The facts
alleged were that plaintiff had obtained in 1969 a concession from
the ruler of Umm al Quayayn, one of the Trucial States, granting
plaintiff the exclusive right to explore for, extract and sell oil
underlying the territorial and offshore waters of Umm al Quayayn.2 In

March, 1970, defendants, upon learning of the richness of plaintiff's
concession area, "induced and procured" the ruler of the Trucial
State, Sharjah, and later the government of Iran, to assert territorial
ownership over the waters in which plaintiff was drilling.' The
British Government, through its political representative in the Trucial
States, forced the plaintiff to desist from operations until the claims
of Sharjah and the Iranian Government could be resolved. Plaintiff
contended that this activity constituted a conspiracy in restraint of
trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act,4 naming the states of

Sharjah, Great Britain and Iran as co-conspirators with defendants.
Defendants urged two arguments: first, that the court lacked
jurisdiction because efforts to secure foreign executive or legislative
action favorable to a monopoly were not within the contemplation of
the antitrust laws; and second, that the act of state doctrine precluded
1. The suit originally included another petroleum company as co-defendant.
The claim against it was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction under the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).

2. The mainland areas of Sharjah and Umm al Quayayn are situated
contiguously at the southeastern end of the Persian Gulf. Plaintiff alleged that at
the time of the concession Sharjah asserted a territorial waters domain of
three miles, including a belt extending three miles seaward from the low water

mark of Abu Musa.
3. The defendants, according to the complaint, had originally negotiated a
concession from Sharjah similar to that of plaintiff's with Umm al Quayayn.
Defendants thereupon "induced" Sharjah to assert territorial sovereignty to
plaintiff's concession area. The British Government ordered Sharjah to desist.
However, when defendants induced the Iranian Oil Company to assert Iranian
sovereignty over the disputed area, the British Government restrained plaintiff
from continuing operations until the conflicting claims could be resolved.
4. "Every contract ...in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1

(1970).
Vol. 5-No. 1
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an adjudication on the merits.5 The District Court for the Central
District of California, held, procurement of foreign governmental

action tending to create a monopoly was not protected from antitrust
jurisdiction, but the act of state doctrine barred a claim for damages
for antitrust violations arising from a foreign sovereign's acts allegedly
induced by defendants. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas &
Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Calif. 1971).
In Underhill v. Hernandez,6 the Supreme Court first announced
the principle that the courts of the United States will not sit in
judgment on the acts of a foreign sovereign acting within its own
territory. This policy, known as the act of state doctrine, has its

"constitutional underpinnings" in the separation of powers doctrine.'
As such, the doctrine prevents domestic courts from exercising
jurisdiction whenever that exercise would infringe upon the executive's constitutional power to regulate foreign affairs.' Because of the
restriction on the power of courts to adjudicate such issues, the act of
state doctrine has proved one of the most formidable barriers to
antitrust claims in which the activities of the defendant are carried on
outside the United States. 9 Thus, in American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co.,' 0 the plaintiff alleged that the Costa Rican Government had
seized plaintiff's railroad at defendant's instigation, contributing to
defendant's monopoly in the banana trade.''

The Supreme Court

5. The defendants asserted three other arguments: first, that the court lacked
jurisdiction under § 1 of the Sherman Act because there was not an effect
both direct and substantial on American commerce; second, that the case should
be dismissed for failure to join Sharjah, Great Britain and Iran as indispensable
parties under rule 19; and third, that the claim was non-justiciable because a

boundary dispute was involved. The court held that it had jurisdiction of the
claim in that the effect on American commerce was not "both insubstantial and
indirect;" that Sharjah, Great Britain and Iran were not indispensable parties

within the meaning of rule 19; and that the "boundary dispute" did not render
the claim non-justiciable because plaintiff's action was in tort, and was not a suit
to quiet title.
6. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
7. Although the act of state doctrine is not constitutionally required, it is
based on the separation of powers and it recognizes the executive's prerogative in
the field of foreign relations. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964).
8. Id. at 432, 433.
9. See generally Haight, Antitrust Laws and the Territorial Principle, 11
VAND. L. REV. 27 (1957).
10. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
11. A critical aspect of the facts was that no effect on American commerce
was really established. The railroad was intended for the export of bananas, and so
Winter, 1971
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held unanimously that the acts complained of were really those of the
Costa Rican Government, and therefore, that the complaint set forth
no cause of action since the claim was barred by the act of state
doctrine. 2 By way of dictum, however, the Court also noted that
because the defendant's acts were not illegal under Costa Rican law,
they were not illegal at all; consequently, the acts were entirely
exempt from American antitrust jurisdiction.' 3
Those cases that have attempted to limit the broad immunity
granted antitrust defendants in American Banana have relied on the
holding of United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.'" Sisal involved a civil
action under the Sherman Act in which it was alleged by the federal
government that the defendants had procured Mexican legislation
favorable to their monopoly on sisal importation into the United
States.'
The Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the

defendants' control of production was aided by the discriminatory
legislation of a foreign country did not prevent an application of the
antitrust laws and an adjudication of the claim.' 6 In addition, the fact
that the defendants had done more than was required of them by the
foreign legislation in question rendered the act of state doctrine
inapplicable.'
The cases that have followed Sisal and distinguished American
Banana have emphasized the discrepancy between "compulsory" and
"permissive" legislation.' 8 If it is the act of the foreign sovereign that
the seizure was alleged to be merely a part of defendant's monopolization of
banana exportation from Latin America. 213 U.S. at 355.
12. 213 U.S. at 359.
13. 213 U.S. at 357. This portion of the opinion has been distinguished in
subsequent international antitrust cases as being limited to the facts of American
Banana. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690
(1962).
14. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
15. The legislation was in the form of discriminatory tax legislation enacted
by the government of Mexico. By means of this legislation, Comisi6n Exportadora
de Yucatan, a Mexican corporation, Sisal Sales Corp., an American corporation,
and three American banks had sought to monopolize the world market in sisal.
274 U.S. at 274.
16. The court said in distinguishing American Banana: "The United States
complain of a violation of their laws within their own territory by parties subject
to their jurisdiction, not merely of something done by another government at the
instigation of private parties. True, the conspirators were aided by discriminating
legislation, but by their own deliberate acts, here and elsewhere, they brought
about the forbidden results within the United States." 274 U.S. at 276.
17. 274 U.S. at 275.
18. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370
U.S. 690 (1962); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); United States
Vol. 5-No. 1
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has created the monopoly by "compulsory" legislation, then the
holding of American Banana applies and the suit is barred. If, on the
other hand, the act in question is really one of private parties who are
acting independently and under cover of a "permissive" foreign law,
then the holding of Sisal is applicable and immunity will not obtain." 9
The decisions subsequent to American Banana and Sisal, however,
have left unresolved the issue of whether the act itself of procuring
foreign legislation favorable to a monopoly is outside the scope of the
antitrust statutes.2 0 The conclusion that such conduct is exempt is
supported by two Supreme Court decisions" 1 which hold that the
Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from associating
together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to
take action regarding a law that might create a restraint or monopoly.
A basic consideration behind these decisions appears to be the theory
that the Sherman Act was not intended to create a barrier between
law making institutions and the wishes of the electorate that they
represent. If the Sherman Act were to prohibit such conduct, it would
be regulating political, not economic, activity-"a purpose which
22

would have no basis whatever in the legislative history of the Act."

An equally important factor contributing to the result reached in the
two cases is that a contrary interpretation of the Sherman Act would
raise grave constitutional questions regarding the right to petition
government.2 3
There has been much speculation concerning the extent to which
this doctrine, known as the Noerr-Penningtonexception, extends to a
defendant's attempt to influence foreign governments.2 4 Some cases
have held that immunity will not be granted except where the
constitutional right to petition government is threatened.2 5 On the
v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 904
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
19. See generally Fugate, Antitrust Jurisdiction and ForeignSovereignty, 49
VA. L. REv. 925 (1963).
20. Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United
States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100, 131 (1967).
21. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
22. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127,137 (1961).
23. 365 U.S. at 138.
24. P. AREEDA. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
187 & n.206 (1967);
Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United States
Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100, 132 (1967).
25. See, e.g., Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of
America 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971).

Winter, 1971

RECENT DECISIONS

other hand, the decision in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp.2 is implied authority for the proposition that efforts
to secure foreign governmental acts with respect to a monopoly are
privileged. In the Continental Ore case, the defendant controlled a
subsidiary corporation which had been appointed by the Canadian
Government as wartime agent for the purchase of plaintiff's product.
The complaint alleged that a conspiracy between the defendant and its
subsidiary had caused plaintiff to be excluded from the Canadian
market.2 7 The defendant asserted immunity to antitrust jurisdiction
on the ground that its activity consisted merely of an attempt to
influence the Canadian Government by virtue of the controls it
exercized over the government's purchasing agent. In denying

immunity, the Court found that no solicitation of the Canadian
Government was involved and held that the Noerr-Pennington
exception did not apply to these facts.2" Although the Court never
reached the issue of whether Noerr would have applied if the
defendant's position regarding its activities had been upheld, it has
nevertheless been argued that the opinion reached the sub silentio
conclusion that under appropriate findings of fact the exception
would have been applicable. 2 9
The instant court held that the Noerr-Pennington exception did
not deprive it of jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. The exception,
stated the court, should be construed strictly and should apply only to
"avoid a construction of the antitrust laws that might trespass upon
the First Amendment right of petition." 3 Additionally, the court
noted that the Noerr-Penningtonexception was based upon the theory
that in a representative democracy, regulations should not be imposed
that would restrict the access of constituents to the governmental
institutions which represent them. Under such an interpretation, the
exception would have little, if any, applicability to acts of foreign
26. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
27. 370 U.S. at 695.
28. 370 U.S. at 702-08. In discussing the Noerr decision, the Court also
said: "To subject [the defendants] to liability under the Sherman Act for
eliminating a competitor from the Canadian market by exercise of the
discretionary power conferred upon Electro Met of Canada by the Canadian
Government would effectuate the purposes of the Sherman Act and would not
remotely infringe upon any of the constitutionally protected freedoms spoken of
in Noerr." Id. at 707-08. That the Court limited the Noerr decision to protecting
constitutional freedoms supports the argument that Continental Ore did not
consider the legal issue of whether the exception applied to foreign acts of state.
29. Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United
States Antitrust Law, 7 VA. J. INT'L L. 100, 132 (1967).
30. 331 F. Supp. at 108.
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governments. The instant court rejected defendants' contention that
Continental Ore represented an implied extension of Noerr-Pennington, reasoning that an equally plausible interpretation of the Continental Ore decision was that a determination of the issue of immunity
was unnecessary because of the facts involved. Since the interests to
be protected by the Noerr-Pennington exception were dissimilar to the
interests urged in the instant case, the court concluded on this issue
that the exception did not apply.
Furthermore, the court held that the act of state doctrine
precluded it from reaching plaintiff's claim on the merits. Citing

American BananaCo. v. United FruitCo., the court ruled that the act of
state doctrine bars a claim for antitrust injury flowing from foreign
sovereign acts allegedly induced and procured by the defendants. In
determining the applicability of United States v. Sisal Sales Corp. to
the facts of the instant case, the court found that the acts complained
of were clearly those of Great Britain, Sharjah and Iran, rather than
those of the defendants. Additionally, the court found that the
contention that the defendants were acting independently and under
cover of foreign law was totally inconsistent with plaintiff's allegations
that the states involved were co-conspirators with the defendants and
that Sharjah was in violation of international law. The court pointed
out that the act of state doctrine created a bar to any examination
regarding the conduct of the states involved and, therefore, precluded a
ruling on whether any of the states had violated international law. The
court concluded that the holding of American Banana governed the
outcome of the case and that plaintiff's complaint did not state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.
The court's decision that the act of state doctrine precluded an
adjudication on the merits of this suit should not be surprising in light
of the facts and holding of American Banana. It would be difficult to
imagine a more appropriate application of the act of state doctrine
than in the instant case, where a foreign sovereign had asserted
jurisdiction over the very territory from which the antitrust injury
arose. More controversial, however, is the court's decision that the
domestic right to solicit governmental action which might create a
monopoly does not embrace efforts to secure action by a foreign
state. Nonetheless, it is clear that in situations where the act of state
doctrine applies, the issue of whether the Noerr-Penningtonexception
will obtain is moot. That doctrine deals solely with the matter of the
court's jurisdiction, which is necessarily determined by a finding of
whether the defendant's conduct is within the scope of the statute.3 1
31. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961).
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The act of state doctrine, however, rests on entirely different grounds;
it assumes that the power to adjudicate exists but dictates that this
Thus, even if the court has
power ought not be exercised. 2
jurisdiction, as in the instant case, the action will be barred under the
holding of American Banana if the act solicited proves to be
"compulsory." The result under this set of circumstances would be
the same irrespective of whether an extension of the Noerr-Pennington
exception were to be found. On the other hand, it is doubtful that an
extension of the doctrine would be determinative of the defendant's
immunity to antitrust liability even if the foreign act involved were
"permissive" rather than "compulsory." In this situation, the holding
of Sisal would govern the outcome of the case. Accordingly, whether
or not the defendant's activity in procuring the foreign law in question
were held to be privileged, he would remain subject to liability if he
continued to monopolize under a "permissive" order or statute. Under
the rule announced in Sisal, the defendant's liability is not premised
on his obtaining discriminatory foreign legislation, but rather is
founded on his going beyond the requirements of that legislation to
monopolize voluntarily. However, since the holding of Noerr appears
to be limited to situations that involve a law that might produce a
restraint or monopoly,3 3 the applicability of the doctrine would arise
only in cases where the antitrust injury flows from the actions of the
foreign state, and not from the defendant's conduct. In short, the
Noerr exception would be relevant only under circumstances in which
the decision reached in American Banana controls. Thus, as the instant
case suggests, the issue of whether the exception carved out in Noerr
extends to seeking or encouraging foreign governmental acts becomes

largely, if not entirely, moot if there is a finding that the act of state
doctrine applies.
Mark R. von Sternberg

32. Although it has been asserted that the "Sabbatino Amendment," 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1970), sapped the act of state doctrine of its strength,
courts have strictly construed the legislation and have not applied it to facts that
do not precisely fit its statutory definition. See, e.g., First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 442 F.2d 530 (1971). The amendment provided that no
United States court should "decline on the ground of the federal act of state
doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the principles of
international law in a case in which a claim of title or other right to property is
asserted by any party... based upon.., a confiscation or other taking... by an
act.., in violation of international law...." The amendment itself was
distinguished in the instant case.
33. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127, 136 (1961).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CITIZENSHIP-FIVE YEAR STATUTORY RESIA CONDITION SUBSEQUENT TO RETENTION
OF CITIZENSHIP BY PERSONS BORN ABROAD NOT VIOLATIVE OF FIFTH
AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS

DENCE REQUIREMENT AS

Plaintiff, a United States citizen, 1 born in Italy of a father who
was an Italian citizen and a mother who was a United States citizen,
brought this action against the Secretary of State to enjoin enforcement of § 301 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,2
which would terminate his citizenship. Plaintiff contended that the
statute's requirement of five year's residency in the United States for
retention of United States citizenship violated his constitutional rights
under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments

since it removed his citizenship without a voluntary renouncement.
The Government, contending it had the power to impose reasonable
conditions for retaining citizenship on those persons who received
their citizenship by statute, argued that § 301 (b) was a reasonable
exercise of that power. The three judge district court found for the
plaintiff and held the section unconstitutional.3 On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, held, reversed. Congress may impose
residence in this country as a reasonable condition subsequent to
the grant of conditional citizenship upon persons who are not born
or naturalized in the United States. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815
(1971).

1. Since his mother was an American citizen, appellee was afforded American
citizenship at birth under the terms of 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (a) (7) (1970), which was
made retroactive to include persons born at the time Bellei was born. This section
provides citizenship for "a person born outside the geographical limits of the
United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and
the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was
physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or
periods totalling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining
the age of fourteen years."
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (b) (1970). This section provides, "Any person who is a
national and citizen of the United States at birth under paragraph (7) of
subsection (a) of this section, shall lose his nationality and citizenship unless he
shall come to the United States prior to attaining the age of twenty-three years
and shall immediately following any such coming be continuously physically
present in the United States for at least five years: Provided, That such physical
presence follows the attainment of the age of fourteen years and preceeds the age
of twenty-eight years."
3. Bellei v. Rusk, 296 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1969).
Winter, 1971

RECENT DECISIONS

The common law rule of jus soli, originally followed in the United
States, 4 predicated citizenship' upon the place of birth. The
extension of citizenship to foreign-born children whose American
fathers had formerly lived in the United States was later accomplished
by the adoption of the rule of jus sanguinisI or right of blood. This
alternative rule granted citizenship in the country of one's ancestors
by descent or heritage. Subsequent legislative actions have merely
assumed that Congress may impose reasonable standards upon such
grants of derivative citizenship,' acquired through descent rather than

place of birth. Additionally, the power of Congress to pass more rigid
requirements8 for the acquisition by other foreign born individuals of
citizenship through naturalization has been upheld regularly by the
Supreme Court? Furthermore, Congress has passed legislation to
revoke citizenship in certain cases. 1 0 These statutes have provided for
the expatriation of citizens who became naturalized citizens of a
4. See 3 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (1942);
3 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 276-82 (1906).

5. Although the terms "citizenship," "nationality" "citizen" and "national"
are often used interchangeably, the terms "national" and "nationality" are
broader and include individuals who are not included in the other terms.
"National" includes both "citizens" and whose who, while not citizens enjoying
full political and civil rights, owe allegiance to that particular country and are
entitled to its protection. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 394 (1962); 3 G.
HACKWORTH, supra note 4, at 1.
6. Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604 (subsequently repealed).
This rule is currently embodied in Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 447, § 301, 66 Stat.
235, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
7. Children whose mothers were American citizens similarly were granted
citizenship in 1934 under the terms of the Act of May 24, 1934, § 1, 48 Stat.
797. Although the provision granted citizenship at birth, a condition for
continuing that citizenship was imposed-they had to return to the United States
by the age of eighteen and execute a declaration of allegiance at twenty-one. This
condition was later altered to the present standard which requires a five year term
of continuous residence between the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (a) (7) (1970). The requirement of continuous presence is lightened
somewhat by 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (b) (1970), which provides that absences of less
than twelve months in the aggregate "shall not be considered to break the
continuity of physical presence" required in subsection (a) (7).
8. See 8 U.S.C. § § 1421-59 (1970).
9. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308 (1961); Weedin v. Chin Bow, 274 U.S.
657 (1927); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) develops basis for

the common law rules in considerable detail).
10. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223. This statute failed to give
express grounds for exercising the "natural and inherent right of all people," but
declared that any administrative attempt to prohibit expatriation is invalid.
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foreign state, of women who married a citizen of another country, and
of those naturalized Americans who returned to their native countries
for specified time periods. As recently as 1940, an entire series of
"expatriating acts" was established,' and with only a few revisions,
the series was reenacted as part of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952.12 In recent cases, however, the Court has imposed
constitutional limitations on the power of Congress. to divest
citizenship under these statutes. In Schneider v. Rusk, 3 the Court
declared unconstitutional § 352 (a) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which provided that a naturalized U.S.
citizen would lose his citizenship if he maintained his residence in the

foreign state of his birth or nationality. The Court held that this
section violated the naturalized citizen's fifth amendment due process
rights because such foreign residency would have no similar effect on a
native-born citizen. Previously, expatriation based upon desertion
during wartime1 4 or upon flight from the country to avoid military
service had been declared unconstitutional."5 In Afroyim v. Rusk, 6
the Supreme Court similarly rejected as unconstitutional the provisions of § 401 (e) of the Nationality Act of 1940, which provided
that voting in a foreign political election would be an "expatriating
act" resulting in the loss of United States citizenship. In reaching its
decision in Afroyim, the Court attempted to establish the definitive
rule that the fourteenth amendment precludes a loss of citizenship
unless the citizen voluntarily relinquishes it.
In the instant case, the Court ruled, first, that since the plaintiff was
not "born or naturalized in the United States," he was not within that
class of citizens to whom the fourteenth amendment's protection
attached. Rather, the Court found that plaintiff's status as a citizen
was dependent upon statutory provisions and that the failure to
satisfy these terminated his right to retain American citizenship. 7
The Court then turned to an examination of the legislation involved
and found that since Congress had an appropriate interest in the
problems of dual nationality and had arrived at a solution that was not
unreasonable, the statute was constitutional. The Court reasoned that
11. Act of Oct. 14, 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § §
1481 (a) (1) to (10) (1970).
12. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § §
1101-1503 (1970).
13. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
14. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
15. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
16. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
17. See cases cited note 9 supra.
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Congress had established rigorous requirements for the naturalization
of foreign born persons in plaintiff's class and that to hold the statute
unconstitutional would result in frustration of congressional intent.
Having concluded that plaintiff's citizenship status was not protected
by the fourteenth amendment and that the Congress had not violated
due process by imposing a five year residency requirement, the Court
held the statute constitutional and denied relief to plaintiff. Justice
Black, dissenting,18 argued that "naturalization" was a generic term
that would include those who, like the plaintiff, were granted
citizenship through statutory provisions. Consequently, plaintiff's
status as a citizen would be protected by the fourteenth amendment
from congressional efforts to remove it. Justice Black pointed out that
the question of the intent of the citizen, established as decisive in

Afroyim, was not considered in § 301(b), and therefore "that section
301(b) is inevitably inconsistent with the constitutional principles
declared in Afroyim. " 9
The instant decision is grounded in the distinction between the
expiration of a conditional grant of citizenship and the expatriation
of a citizen. The majority deemed this distinction to be crucial, since
fourteenth amendment rights, as articulated in Afroyim, were felt to
apply only to the expatriation of citizens. This distinction appears to be
a retreat from the earlier absolute position on the inviolability of
citizenship set forth in Afroyim and seems to reflect a changing attitude
toward the balance between the rights of the individual and those of the
state. This new distinction will create problems in at least two areas.
First, considerable doubt remains regarding the constitutionally permissible scope and duration of conditions subsequent that may be imposed
on individuals in plaintiff's class. Decisions indicating that there are few,
if any, limits on congressional authority in this area20 were all decided
before Afroyim. The effect of Afroyim on these decisions remains
unclear. Moreover, congressional authority to formulate rules for

18. Justice Black was joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall. Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Douglas, also dissented in an opinion in which he
commented, "In light of the complete lack of rational basis for distinguishing
among citizens whose naturalization was carried out within the physical bounds of
the United States, and those, like Bellei, who may be naturalized overseas, the
conclusion is compelled that the reference in the Fourteenth Amendment to
persons 'born or naturalized in the United States' includes those naturalized
through an Act of Congress, wherever they may be at the time." 401 U.S. at 845.
19. 401 U.S. at 845.
20. United States ex rel. Harrington v. Schlotfeldt, 136 F.2d 935 (7th Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 731 (1946) (naturalization revoked ten years after
granted for conduct demonstrating lack of allegiance to the United States).
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naturalization-the process which those in Bellei's class must now use
to become citizens-is expressly granted in the Constitution.2 1 Taken
together, these two factors would seem to indicate that the creation of
another definitive rule, as Afroyim was thought to be, is unlikely.
Rather, the probable result will be challenges to selected provisions of
the naturalization laws and a continuing review of this area of the law.
The second major concern is the administrative feasibility of the new
standards, which have yet to be formulated. Conclusively, whatever
rules are adopted will be more difficult to apply than the absolute
position that, according to Justice Black, was established in Afroyim.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether the complex and interrelated
problems of expatriation, dual nationality, statelessness and the

conflicting requirements of various countries are capable of rational
solution through the unilateral efforts of any nation, even when based
on arguably sound constitutional standards. The Court was careful to
note that the plaintiff would not be left stateless as a result of its
opinion,2 and this may be a basis for distinction in future cases.
Authorities in this area have urged the adoption of a "dominant
nationality" test as a possible solution to the problem of dual
nationality. 2 3 They also have stressed the need for multi-national
action to eliminate the problems of conflicting requirements for
citizenship and statelessness. 2 4 The transnational significance of this

21. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8.
22. 401 U.S. at 836.
23. Dual nationality, such as Bellei possessed prior to his twenty-third
birthday, is a complex problem which, simply because of its dual nature, cannot
be solved by the actions of any one government. Unilateral efforts to clear up the
area in the past have resulted only in further confusion. See note 24 infra.
Political considerations are also involved. This was recently demonstrated by the
protests of various Arab leaders following the Afroyim decision that it reflected a
desire on the part of the United States to encourage Americans to serve in the
Israeli Army. N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1969, at 14, col. 1; id., Oct. 19, 1969, at 18,
col. 3.
24. Areas which are particularly troublesome seem to be marriage, naturalization in one country without consent of the citizen's former country, and claims
concerning inheritance or property taxes on holdings of relatives in foreign
countries. See Russell, Dual Nationality in Practice-Some Bizarre Results, 4
INT'L LAWYER 756 (1970). Mr. Russell concludes, "[D]ual nationality will be
with us as long as some states look chiefly to the place of birth (jus soli), and
others to descent (jus sanguinis). Also, we shall have it as long as some states do,
and some do not, require their permission for their nationals to become
naturalized elsewhere; and as long as some states do, and some do not, permit an
automatic change of nationality by marraige." Id. at 763. One of the primary
causes of the War of 1812 was the impressment of American sailors who had been
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case, then, is its demonstration of the degree to which such essential
rights as citizenship have become subject to attenuated legal subtleties
due to the inability of the countries involved to formulate a rational
and uniform standard. In view of the uncertainty presently surrounding these laws within the United States this would seem to be
the appropriate time for the creation of such uniform standards.
Jesse W. Hill

British subjects but whose naturalization was not recognized as effective by the
Crown. A.

BURT, THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, AND BRITISH
NORTH AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF

AFTER THE WAR OF 1812, at 305-16 (1940). Clearly, then,
multi-national efforts are the only solution. Fortunately, there has been some
effort in this direction. See, e.g., Int'l L. Comm'n. Nationality Including
Statelessness, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/66 (1953); Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness. U.N. Doc. A/Conf.9/15 (1961). See also VISHNIAK, JEWS AND
THE POST-WAR WORLD (1945); Griffin, The Right to a Single Nationality, 40
PEACE

TEMP. L.Q. 57 (1966).
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IMMUNITY-ExEcUTIVE

SUGGESTION BINDING ON COURTS DESPITE CONTRACTUAL WAIVER OF
IMMUNITY

Plaintiff, Isbrandtsen Tankers, sued the President of India in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
for losses arising from allegedly unreasonable delays in unloading
vessels.' In the charter party, India had agreed to settle all disputes in
the New York district court.2 After India had filed an answer to the
complaint, the U.S. Department of State sent a formal suggestion of
immunity to the district court. Plaintiff asserted that the court
retained jurisdiction over the controversy in spite of the State
Department's suggestion, reasoning that defendant had waived its

immunity both in the charter party and by a general appearance in
court. The district court found that the formal written suggestion of
immunity by the State Department precluded any further inquiry and
dismissed the case. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed. Courts are bound by a State
Department suggestion of sovereign immunity, notwithstanding the
commercial nature of the transaction, a contractual waiver of
immunity, and the foreign sovereign's general appearance in court.
Isbrandtsen Tankers Inc. v.President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. Nov. 19, 1971).
The United States doctrine of sovereign immunity was first
enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon.3 Reasoning that subjection to the jurisdiction of another
state was incompatible with the doctrine of state sovereignty, the
Court concluded that the dignity, equality and absolute independence
of foreign states rendered them immune from the jurisdiction of the
host state. Justice Marshall viewed territorial jurisdiction as an
attribute of sovereignty; thus, when a friendly government entered the
territory of another, an implied waiver of jurisdiction was said to be
given by the host. If a suit were brought against the visiting sovereign,
the State Department was to verify the waiver of jurisdiction by
making a suggestion of immunity to the court in which suit was
1. Isbrandtsen tankers were being used to deliver emergency grain supplies to
India to relieve a national famine caused by the drought in 1965 and 1966.
2. Paragraph 34 of the Charter Party provides: "Any and all differences and'
disputes arising under this Charter Party are to be determined by the U.S. Courts
for the Southern District of New York, but this does not preclude a party from
pursuing any in rein proceedings in another jurisdiction or from submission by
mutual agreement of any differences or disputes to arbitration." Isbrandtsen
Tankers Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1199 (2d Cir. 1971).
3. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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brought.4 The scope of The Schooner Exchange remained limited to
military and diplomatic activities until the end of World War I. Then,
in complicated litigation involving the Italian ship Pesaro, the Court
adopted a theory of absolute sovereign immunity by extending immunity to trading vessels that were in the possession and service of a foreign
sovereign, notwithstanding the fact that these vessels were engaged in
commerce.' In The Pesaro6 the State Department, in response to
judicial inquiry, contended that when a foreign government enters
into commercial activity it should not receive privileges given to
public vessels of war because the United States does not demand
privileges for its own commercial vessels. 7 Marking the only occasion
when a court has not followed the suggestion of the State Department
regarding sovereign immunity,' the Court in Pesaro reasoned that
since a foreign sovereign was immune when maintaining her naval
4. Id. at 146. During this era most of a sovereign's extra-territorial activities
were military or diplomatic. These activities, the Court noted, were manifestly
different from a sovereign's trading in commerce. It implied, but did not hold,
that the latter was not immune. Id. at 143.
5. In the original action, a libel in admiralty, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, in an unreported opinion, released the vessel Pesaro
from arrest. The court took this action upon the "suggestion" of the Italian
Ambassador, made directly to the court, that the vessel was immune from United
States jurisdiction because it was owned by the Italian Government. The Supreme
Court, hearing the case on direct appeal, reversed. Noting that a certificate of the
Secretary of State acknowledging the Ambassador to be the accredited representative of Italy fell short of sanctioning immunity, the Court held that "the
suggestion should come through official [executive] channels of the United
States.. . ." 255 U.S. 216, 219 (1921). On remand, the district court, following
advice from the State Department, overruled objections to United States
jurisdiction and held that commercial vessels owned by foreign governments were
not immune from arrest in admiralty. The Pesaro, 277 F. 473,482-83 (S.D.N.Y.
1921) (Mack, J.). Due to procedural irregularities, this order was subsequently
vacated by consent of the parties. See The Pesaro, 13 F.2d 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1926).
The jurisdictional issue was raised for the final time in 1926 before Judge
Augustus Hand who declined to follow Judge Mack's earlier opinion. Holding that
commercial vessels owned by foreign governments were entitled to immunity, he
dismissed the libel. The Pesaro, 13 F.2d 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1926). The Supreme
Court heard the case on direct appeal and affirmed. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Pesaro,
271 U.S. 526 (1926).
6. 277 F. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
7. Id. at 479-80, n.3.
8. See Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710, 725 (E.D. Va. 1961).
"[A]n examination of the opinions of the United States Supreme Court will
reveal only one decision [Pesaro] in which the recommendation of the State
Department was discarded."
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force for the protection of her citizens, the sovereign was also immune
while conducting trade for the commercial benefit of her people. The
immunity of government trading vessels was confirmed in Ex parte
Peru.9 In that case, the State Department sent the Court a suggestion
which recognized and allowed Peru's claim of immunity. The Court
held that it was bound by the suggestion and dismissed the case.1 0
Subsequently, in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,II the sovereign
immunity doctrine was expanded by the Court's holding that it was
bound to follow executive policy even in the absence of a suggestion
of immunity, intimating that when the executive was silent the Court
should not grant immunity. 2 In 1952, in order to guide the courts,
the State Department released the so-called Tate Letter announcing a
new policy of restrictive immunity. The Department indicated that it
would henceforth deny immunity to private acts of a sovereign, but
would continue to grant it to public acts.'" The Tate Letter added
confusion to the issue of the conclusiveness of the Department's
suggestions, however, by stating that although such suggestions were
not controlling, the courts should follow them." 4 Even greater
difficulty was encountered in trying to distinguish between public and
private acts of a state. Various tests were proposed, the most generally
accepted being that which was established in Victory TransportInc. v.
Comisaria General de Abastecimientes y Transportes, limiting public
acts to specified classes of activity.'
Nevertheless, scholars have
generally agreed that the public-private distinction is inadequate
because of the variance in governmental involvement in economic
9. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
10. The Court reasoned that any decision on the question of immunity would
inevitably affect diplomatic relations and thereby lead the Court into a realm
reserved exclusively to the executive branch by the constitutional distribution of
powers. Furthermore the Court found itself bound to follow the suggestion in
order to avoid embarrassing the executive branch in the management of foreign
affairs. Id. at 582.
11. 324 U.S. 30 (1945), aff'g, 143 F. 2d 854 (9th Cir. 1944), aff'g sub nom.
The Baja California, 45 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
12. 324 U.S. at 36-38. Immunity was denied because Mexico, although
holding title to the vessel, did not have actual possession of it.
13. 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 969 (1952). The Department's rationale was
that the grant of absolute immunity to foreign governments in American courts
was inconsistent with the submission of the United States to the jurisdiction of
other countries. Id. at 984-85.
14. Id. at 985.

15. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). These
classes are: (1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien; (2)
legislative acts, such as nationalization; (3) acts concerning the armed forces; (4)
acts concerning diplomatic activity; (5) public loans. 336 F.2d at 360.
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activities." 6 Compounding the difficulty is the fact that the Department may suggest immunity even when immunity has been waived' I
or when the activity is commercial in character. For example, in Rich
v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A.,"8 a Cuban-owned ship was brought into
United States jurisdiction by a defecting master and crew the day after
Cuba had returned a hijacked commercial airliner to the United
States.' 9 When the Cuban-owned ship entered the territorial waters of
the United States, the primary concern of the executive department
was to return the ship as soon as possible in order to encourage the
Cuban Government to return any other aircraft that might be hijacked
and to prevent political flare-ups in both countries.20 American
creditors, however, managed to bring libels against the ship and its

cargo. The State Department made a suggestion of immunity which
was resisted in court by the creditors on the ground that it would be
contrary to the policy enunciated by the State Department in the Tate
Letter. 2 The court in Rich, despite the holding of absolute immunity
in Pesaro and the Supreme Court's approval of the Tate Letter
doctrine in Republic of China v. National City Bank,2 2 held itself
bound by the State Department's suggestion and, following Peru and
Hoffman, dismissed the case.
16. See, e.g., Lauterpacht, The Problems of Jurisdictional Immunities of
Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 225-26 (1951); Fitzmaurice, State
Immunity From Proceedings in Foreign Courts, 14 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 101,

123-24 (1933).
17. The Uxmal, 40 F. Supp. 258 (D. Mass. 1941) (immunity waived by a
general appearance in court). A suggestion of immunity was made by the State
Department. 3 U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, PAPERS RELATING TO THE FOREIGN

453-59 (1943).
18. 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va. 1961), aff'd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
19. To obtain the release of the aircraft and to calm fears in both Cuba and
the United States, the President had promised to return a Cuban patrol boat. The
Cubans were fearful that the aircraft hijacking was an American ploy to justify a
second attempt at the recently aborted Bay of Pigs invasion. N.Y. Times, July 30,
1961, at 1, col. 6. The American populace, on the other hand, initially was misled
by the press into believing that the hijacking was carried out by a Castro agent in
retaliation for the Bay of Pigs invasion. See U.S. State Dep't Press Release of Aug.
12, 1961, 45 DEP'T STATE BULL. 407 (1961).
20. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1961, at 1, col. 6. Cuba was to return the plane and
the United States was to grant sovereign immunity to the Cuban boat. Cuba said
in its note of Aug. 4, 1961, that if the United States returned the boat, Cuba
would reciprocate regarding American vessels and planes in a similar position in
the future.
21. 197 F. Supp. at 724.
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

22. 348 U.S. 356 (1954), rev'g, 208 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1953), affg, 108 F.
Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (Court denied immunity from counter-claim when
China sought remedy in United States courts).
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The court in the instant case found that a decision to deny
immunity could have serious international repercussions with which
the judiciary was incapable of dealing. The court reasoned that the
impact of these consequences required an extra-legal decision by the
executive department before the court could consider the legal issues
in the case. Therefore, when the executive submitted a suggestion of
immunity, the court was bound to dismiss the case. Were it not to
follow the suggestion, the court implied that it would be intruding
into the sphere of foreign relations, an area reserved exclusively to the
executive branch by the Constitution. The court reasoned further that
India's waiver of immunity would neither reduce the possible
international repurcussions of a judicial assertion of jurisdiction nor
lessen the embarrassment to the executive department. Expressing
sympathy for the plaintiff, the court nonetheless concluded that the
politically motivated executive suggestion precluded its consideration
of the legal aspects of the case, including the issue of waiver of
immunity.
The conflict between the executive and judicial departments that
is exemplified by the instant decision has plagued United States
jurisprudence since the 1921 Pesaro case. Arguably, when the
executive department commits the United States to an international
position that precludes an individual's claim against a foreign
government in the United States, the individual's right to due process
is violated,2 3 and the executive unconstitutionally abridges the
judicial function. 2 4 On the other hand, if in the instant case the
United States were to allow Isbrandtsen to assert its claim for damages
against India, it would be inconsistent with the United States decision
to give massive relief aid to India.2" When such a conflict between the
national interest and an individual's interest arises, the individual
should be entitled to have his interests balanced against those of the
23. See M. Cardozo, Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in
Court, 67 HARV. L. REV. 608 (1954).
24. The State Department's power to decide that some claims against foreign
governments will be entertained by the courts, and others will not, constitutes
discretionary control of an individual's access to the courts which violates the
principle of separation of powers. "The complete independence of the courts of
justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.... Without this all the
reservations of the particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing." THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 100 (M. Dunne ed. 1901) (A. Hamilton).
25. It is inconsistent and clearly embarrassing for the executive to have said,
on the one hand, that "America will do more than her part" in providing
emergency food supplies, and, on the other hand, to allow Isbrandtsen to sue
India for delaying its ships during the emergency. Speaking on India's emergency
food-grain deficit resulting from the 1965 drought, the President in a joint
Winter, 1971
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United States in a judicial proceeding. If the determination is made by
the State Department, however, the individual's right is not protected
because the Department does not weigh the legal merit of the
claimant's position, 6 but rather asseses only the political consequences of denying immunity.2 7 Text writers have justified the
executive's power to make such determinations of immunity by
arguing that the United States must speak "with only one voice" and
that the determination must be made solely by the executive in the
interest of furthering foreign relations.2" Alternatively, several jurists
have argued that the decision on the question of immunity should be

made by the judiciary, rather than the State Department, because it is
better equipped to develop principles of international law.2 9 The
proponents of this view contend that the Supreme Court should
communique said, "The problem should be viewed not in isolation but in the
context of an incipient world-wide food deficit, a challenge to humanity as a
whole that merits the sustained and serious attention of all nations." 54 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 604 (1966). Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United
Nations, said: "[W]e are fully prepared to participate in such an effort. India's
problem is the world's problem. We believe that all men of good will have a stake
in seeing that people do not starve. As President Johnson said last week: 'You can
be sure that America will do more than her part.'" 54 DEP'T STATE BULL. 385
(1966).
26. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES, § 58, comment b at 201 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1958). The Department
usually conducts an ex parte hearing to decide whether to grant immunity.
27. P. JESSUP, THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 77, 78-83 (1959).
28. M. Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions:
Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper? 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461,

462 (1963). Professor Cardozo contends that in practice the question of
immunity depends upon the demands of international comity, and the judicial
process is unsuited for determining the urgency of this demand. Id. at 471-72. See
also Bilder, The Office of Legal Advisor: The State Department Lawyer and
Foreign Affairs, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 633, 673-74 (1962).

Cardozo concedes that disposition of a citizen's claim by a State Department
suggestion apparently violates the individual's right to due process since he is
denied the opportunity to present his case. But Cardozo would remedy the
present situation by providing for a hearing at the time the Department decides on
the request for immunity. M. Cardozo, supra note 23.
29. E.g., JEssuP,supra note 27, at 78-79. Judge Jessup contends that the
determination should be made judicially on the basis of international legal
principles and not on the varying needs of diplomacy or national policy. Once the
court has recognized that the problem requires the application of international
law, it could use the same sources of law used by the Court of International
Justice. Jessup resisted suggestions that the State Department conduct hearings in
determining immunity because the Department then would be exercising the
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repudiate the Ex parte Peru doctrine3 0 of the conclusiveness of the
executive suggestion and, instead, seek non-obligatory executive
advice on foreign policy. The instant case provided the Court with an
appropriate vehicle to do so, but the Court wisely denied certiorari. It
would appear that a reversal of Isbrandtsen would merely substitute
one unworkable alternative for another; for a solution that places the

decision totally in the hands of either branch of government is
unsatisfactory. An organizational scheme is required which will
provide for the cooperation of governmental branches, each making

the decisions appropriate to its own function. I To obtain this result
requires the enactment of positive law. Legislative provision for
substitution of the United States as defendant in limited situations
appears necessary to ensure fairness to private parties and to maintain
a separation of powers of the judiciary and executive without
diminishing the power of either. This could be achieved by providing
that courts determine the question of immunity on the basis of
international law, seeking the advice of the State Department
concerning the interest of the United States in foreign relations. Under
this proposal, once an individual has obtained jurisdiction under any
of the present means, the executive would be given the option to
intervene and substitute the United States as defendant, rendering
itself liable to pay any judgment. 3 2 Consequently, a grant of
judicial function, and because the courts could do the job better and
simultaneously contribute to international principles of law. Id. at 82-83; accord,
Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. IN T'L
L. 93, 99 (1953); Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States-A Proposal for
Reform of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 901, 906 (1969); Franck, The
Courts, the State Department and National Policy: A Criterion for Judicial
Abdication, 44 MINN. L. REV. 1101, 1123 (1960); Dickinson, TheLaw ofNations
as National Law: "PoliticalQuestions" 104 U. PA. L. REV. 451,476-79 (1956).
30. Note 10 supra and accompanying text.
31. Professor Lowenfeld proposes to limit the jurisdiction of United States
courts and to eliminate the requirement of attachment and personal process prior
to taking jurisdiction. Such a proposal would tend to remove the executive from
the decision on immunity. Lowenfeld, supra note 29. This solution is not
desirable because it diminishes the power of the courts in dealing with claims
against a foreign country. Without the ability to attach a vessel, for examples the
court may be unable to execute its judgment.
32. Substitution might be inappropriate in cases involving a foreign government's expropriation of property abroad owned by an American citizen. A
shipping contract between an individual and a foreign government is distinguish-

able from a foreign government's expropriation of private property. Because of
the element of trade it is conceivable that substitution would apply in the former
case but not in the latter. In addition, restrictions would have to be placed on the
substitution practice to prevent fraud and misuse of the device.
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immunity by the State Department would not deprive the plaintiff of
his right to due process for he would still have the opportunity to
litigate his claim. Regardless of whether the Department grants
immunity, the court would decide the case, perhaps even granting
immunity. The executive would be given a greater freedom in the
conduct of international affairs since it would be able to intervene
in the service of process, receive process itself, and completely
insulate a foreign government from suit. 33 It would become a
function of the executive to prevent the courts from exercising
jurisdiction in a manner that would disrupt foreign relations. The
provisions for the payment of judgments by the United States
Government varies significantly from present practice and would
undoubtedly be the most difficult suggestion to implement. It can be
justified, however, on the ground that when immunity is granted by
the Department, it is for the benefit of the nation. When the United
States is substituted, it pays a judgment only after the plaintiff has
obtained jurisdiction over the foreign government and then only after
testing the merits of the plaintiff's claim in court. The United States
may either hold the judgment for collection at a later time or consider
it an expense of maintaining a viable foreign policy.3 4 In addition, the
proposed scheme would avoid a conflict in the roles of the two
branches and would enable the courts to develop a law of sovereign
immunity under a more orderly process. Under the present state of
the law, a businessman cannot predict whether he will be able to
enforce his contract with a foreign country, thereby necessarily
increasing the risks (and costs) of doing business overseas and
discouraging foreign trade. This negative effect is contrary to the

United States policy of increasing foreign trade in order to improve its
balance of payments. 3" Under the substitution proposal, foreign trade
would be encouraged because individuals would be able to rely on an
established body of law and the executive would not be able
33. The executive's need for this ability was well demonstrated in the Rich
case. With full scale war hopefully a thing of the past, political and economic
maneuvering become vital to the national interest and the proposed power of the
executive would be more essential than the analogous national emergency powers
granted in 50 U.S.C. § 404 (1970).
34. The Government cannot make available unlimited funds to pay these
judgments, consequently the executive is limited somewhat in its choice to grant
immunity. But this deficiency is minor compared to the inequity of peremptorily
dismissing a plaintiff's claim for the benefit of United States foreign relations.

35. 60

DEP'T STATE BULL.

96 (1969). A goal of the 1970 budget was to

"assure a favorable long-range impact on our balance of payments by financing
the growth of United States exports and by building new markets for our exports
through our aid."
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summarily to conclude an individual's claim. In the absence of
legislative action on this problem, however, it appears that possibly
unconstitutional effects upon American claimants will continue, and
they will be bound to bear the loss.
Glen T. Oxton

